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REDISCOVERING LIBERTY OF CONTRACT:
THE UNNOTICED ECONOMIC RIGHT
CONTAINED IN THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Steven C. Begakis*

“Dictum Meum Pactum.”1
“‘I have spoken, and I will bring it to pass;
I have purposed, and I will do it.’”2

The liberty of contract formation is a form of speech,
and thus it is a right guaranteed by the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. This Article examines how the First
Amendment secures the liberty of contract formation and
analyzes how that liberty is supported by the U.S. Supreme
Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence and by both
originalist and traditionalist theories of Constitutional
interpretation.

* Law Clerk to the Honorable Margaret A. Ryan, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces. J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School. B.A., Political Science and Economics,
University of California, Santa Barbara. To my father, Prodromos Begakis, who taught me the
value of economic freedom to the forgotten man, and to my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ, who
pleads the Father’s eternal promises to me before the highest heavenly court.
1. “My Word is My Bond”—motto of the London Stock Exchange.
2. Isaiah 46:11.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects—and
therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court should recognize and enforce—
the liberty to form a contract, balanced against the right of the states
under their historic police powers and the U.S. Congress under its
enumerated legislative powers to prohibit and punish the formation
of contracts3 that are contrary to a sufficiently important public
policy.4 Constitutional text establishes the right, the Court’s
“commercial speech” precedent foreshadows its recognition,5 and
originalist and traditionalist theories justify its judicial protection.6
At first glance this claim may seem far-fetched. To a certain
extent it is. No court has ever recognized such a right in the First
Amendmnt, and no scholar has ever proposed its recognition.7 Yet
my proposal sounds strange, and is strange, because we live in a
strange world of modern constitutional theory. After West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish,8 and especially after Williamson v. Lee Optical
of Oklahoma, Inc.,9 it has become a veritable article of faith to
modern theorists that Lochner v. New York10 was totally,
irredeemably wrong.11 Because we moderns start with the baseline
assumption that “liberty of contract” cannot be in the Constitution,
our natural inclination is to think that the Free Speech Clause could
not possibly protect a liberty of contract formation. But this
inclination is in tension with certain historical and constitutional
facts.
Consider the following: The freedom to form a contract that is
3. Because I argue that the First Amendment protects the negative liberty to form a contract
free from restraint, and not the positive liberty to demand that the government enforce a contract
already formed, this liberty would be balanced against the right of the government only to
prohibit or punish contract formation, not its power to deem a contract already formed as
unenforceable. This right is only the right to speak a contract into existence.
4. I use the term “sufficiently important” advisedly, not to stake a claim for a particular
level of judicial scrutiny, but only to acknowledge that in any balancing of rights against
government interests, a valid interest must be put forward and justified by the government.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 527, 564–79 (2015) (cataloguing legal thinkers who advocate a return to federal
constitutional protection for liberty of contract through either the Due Process Clause, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, or the Ninth Amendment).
8. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
9. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11. See Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 527–30.
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not contrary to the health, safety, and morals of the community is one
of the most ancient liberties of the English-speaking world.12 But the
U.S. Constitution, the supreme charter of English freedom, currently
provides zero protection against arbitrary abridgements of this
freedom.13 Isn’t that strange?
There are, of course, oddities to the Constitution, as there are to
any human law. The Constitution did not spring fully formed from
the head of Zeus. It is the product of historically contingent
prejudices and political compromises of imperfect people. So it is
odd, for example, that the Constitution would not abolish slavery,
when slavery was manifestly contrary to the warp and woof of the
Constitution—not to mention the Declaration of Independence. But
there was a reason for the wrinkle in the tapestry: without
compromises on the issue of slavery, the Constitution would not
have been ratified.14
As a general matter, the Constitution is a fulsome and coherent
document, designed to anticipate government overreaches and
provide tools for the resolution of unforeseen national challenges.
While drafted in part to solve the crisis of the Articles of
Confederation, it was also intended to be a document for the ages,
the result of careful reflection upon the whole experience of English
and Western civilization.15 A glaring omission of a central article of
the common law—the liberty of contract formation—should raise
eyebrows.
Common law contract rights long predate the freedom of the
press, a freedom that the Framers believed was a natural right.16
Moreover, they were part and parcel of the Englishman’s ancient
property rights that were explicitly protected in the Due Process and

12. See generally, e.g., A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT:
THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT (1975) (discussing the medieval origins of assumpsit
actions).
13. See Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487–89 (articulating an imperviously deferential rational
basis standard of review for economic regulations). But see St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d
215, 221–23 (5th Cir. 2013) (securing a minimal level of substantive due process review for
economic regulation).
14. See generally, e.g., LYNNE CHENEY, JAMES MADISON: A LIFE RECONSIDERED (2014)
(detailing the precarious politics of the Philadelphia Convention).
15. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 281 (James Madison) (“But what is
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?”).
16. Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102
YALE L.J. 907, 910–13 (1993).
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Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.17 This is an odd
constitutional disjunction: property is explicitly protected, but there
is apparently no similar protection for contracting, which is an
essential means of alienating—and thus exercising autonomous
control over—one’s property.18 Given this disjunction, one might be
tempted to find the liberty of contract implicit in the Due Process
Clause, either as a “liberty” or “property” interest protected from
arbitrary deprivation.19 However, the Court has ruled this out,20 so
the mismatch between protection for property, but not contracting,
remains.
More puzzling still, the Framers explicitly prohibited states from
impairing contracts already formed.21 And this prohibition was
absolute22—not a mere minimum prohibition on arbitrariness. Why
would the Framers include a specific prohibition against contract
impairment, but not a right to contract formation? The first answer is
logical: the sovereign has an unquestioned interest in setting the rules
of contracting, but far less of an interest in vitiating a lawful contract
already formed, which carries not only the weight of legality, but the
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. See Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW:
NEW ESSAYS 132 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) (“If we must suppose that contract formation consists
in a transfer of entitlement from one party to the other—as is necessary if the expectation
principle is to function as a principle of compensation—the foregoing analysis of a transfer of
ownership in the case of an executed conveyance of property should also apply to contract.
Reflecting the logic of a transfer of ownership, it must be possible to understand contract as
constituted by two mutually related acts of alienation and appropriation which are at once
temporally successive and yet absolutely co-present.”).
19. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905); see also James Madison, Property, in
4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 478–80 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1865),
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=DzVEAQAAMAAJ&pg=GBS.PA478 (“In its larger
and juster meaning, [‘property’] embraces everything to which a man may attach a value and
have a right . . . [In that enlarged sense,] a man has a property in his opinions and the free
communication of them . . . . He has property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his
person. He has an equal property in a free use of his faculties, and free choice of the objects on
which to employ them. In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may equally
be said to have a property in his rights.”).
20. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
22. See, e.g., McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. 608, 613–14 (1844) (“If the defendant had
made such an agreement as to authorize a sale of his property . . . it would have conferred a right
on the plaintiff, which the Constitution made inviolable; and it can make no difference whether
such right is conferred by the terms or law of the contract. Any subsequent law which denies,
obstructs, or impairs this right, by superadding a condition . . . affects the obligation of the
contract . . . [for] the prevention of such sale is the denial of a right.”). But see Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434–35 (1934) (announcing a police power exception to
the Contracts Clause).
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moral obligation of execution that justifies the legal enforcement of
contracts in the first place.23 There is also a historical explanation:
state legislatures under the Articles of Confederation had impaired
contracts to cancel debts during economic crisis, leading to crippling
increases in interest rates.24 The Framers learned through experience
that there was a political temptation to impair contracts during crisis,
resulting in predictable economic harm, so they enacted a federal
prohibition on the practice.25 The Framers had no comparable
experience with state legislatures arbitrarily regulating contract
formation.
Maybe the Framers saw the liberty of contract as so basic, so
fundamental, that they simply assumed that no American
government, state or federal, would ever think or dare to abridge it.
But that is implausible. First, the more basic the right, the more
anxious the Framers were to protect it. The rights to due process,26
trial by jury,27 security in one’s person and effects,28 privacy from
military quartering,29 keep and bear arms,30 petition the
government,31 speak,32 and practice religion33—these rights and
others, some considered by the Framers to be pre-political and
fundamental to a free society,34 were explicitly protected. The
Framers even prohibited ex post facto legislation,35 a principle that
was considered so basic to legislating that including it in the
23. See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 316 (1935) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting) (“Just men regard repudiation and spoliation of citizens by their sovereign with
abhorrence; but we are asked to affirm that the Constitution has granted power to accomplish
both. No definite delegation of such a power exists; and we cannot believe the farseeing framers,
who labored with hope of establishing justice and securing the blessings of liberty, intended that
the expected government should have authority to annihilate its own obligations and destroy the
very rights which they were endeavoring to protect. Not only is there no permission for such
actions; they are inhibited. And no plenitude of words can conform them to our charter.”).
24. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 453–65 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (describing the historical
backdrop of the framing of the Contracts Clause).
25. Id.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. Id. amend. VI.
28. Id. amend. IV.
29. Id. amend. III.
30. Id. amend. II.
31. Id. amend. I.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1513, 1517 (2011).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. (prohibiting both ex post facto laws and bills of attainder).
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Constitution was deemed by some to be an affront to the legislature’s
intelligence.36 The Framers were a paranoid bunch with a limitless
imagination of government tyranny.
Generally speaking, Congress could only constitutionally
abridge the formation of a contract through its power to regulate
commerce among the several states—a limited power.37 Moreover,
contract law was a traditional domain of the state governments
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.38 A guarantee of
contract freedom against the federal government would therefore be
theoretically unnecessary, even under the most frightful government
abuses imagined by the Framers. As noted above, however, the
Framers provided specific protection for property rights39—a state
law matter that, like contracting, could only be plausibly abridged
through the commerce power.
And so we are left with an oddity, a gap, in the Constitution. We
would have expected the Framers to protect contract freedom, but
they apparently did not. At this point, there is a powerful temptation
to shrug the proverbial shoulder and move on. After all, the judicial
and scholarly rejection of Lochner is nearly total,40 and therefore the
burden on those who would defend anything like a doctrine of
contract freedom is immense.
But this supposed gap—no protection, at all, of contract
formation—only makes sense in our modern milieu. More
specifically, it only makes sense in light of the epochal political
drama of the New Deal—the assault on free enterprise by the
Progressives and the judicial transformation of the Constitution
designed to accommodate it. Popular modern theoretical approaches,
such as originalism and traditionalism, cannot explain why the First
Amendment does not, or should not, protect contract formation. Only
36. See O’Scannlain, supra note 34, at 1518 (“The principle was so obvious, and so widely
known, that some Framers thought it was unnecessary, and almost embarrassing, to declare it in
the Constitution as though it were news. James Wilson, for one, feared that placing an ex post
facto ban in the Constitution would ‘proclaim that we are ignorant of the first principles of
Legislation, or are constituting a Government which will be so.’ Thus, we see that the Ex Post
Facto Clause merely codified a principle which eighteenth century lawyers grew up believing was
a fundamental command of the natural law.” (citations omitted)).
37. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 64–65 (1824). But see Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 118–25 (1942) (recognizing a virtually limitless scope of Congressional authority
to legislate under the Commerce Clause).
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
39. Id. amend. V.
40. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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the sacralization of the New Deal and its political monuments
explains our constitutional paradox.
Part I of this Article demonstrates through text and precedent
that contract formation is in fact a form of speech protected by the
First Amendment. Part II considers the prudence of recognizing a
First Amendment liberty of contract formation in light of two
modern constitutional theories: originalism and traditionalism. Part
III analyzes whether the Court would be perceived as more
legitimate if it utilized the Due Process Clause, Privileges or
Immunities Clause, or the Ninth Amendment as an alternative textual
vehicle to protect the liberty of contract formation.
II. LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR PROTECTING CONTRACT FORMATION
The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”41 The First Amendment
presumptively protects all speech; speech is only unprotected if it is
part of an identified category of speech that is traditionally subject to
censorship and punishment.42 Moreover, speech only receives a
lower level of protection if the regulation is not content-based,43 or if
there are compelling reasons for treating that speech as uniquely
suspect.44 This section will examine whether contract formation is
speech protected by the First Amendment.
A. Argument from Text: Contract Formation Is Speech
The formation of a contract has three basic elements: offer,
acceptance, and consideration.45 An offer and an acceptance are
either words or expressive actions that contain objective
manifestations of a promise.46 Put another way, a promise is speech,
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–72 (2010).
43. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
44. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–
64 (1980) (granting less protection to commercial speech).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). (“[T]he
formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the
exchange and a consideration.”); id. § 22(1) (“The manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange
ordinarily takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by the
other party or parties.”).
46. Id. § 24 (“An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as
to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will
conclude it.”); id. § 50(1) (“Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms
thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer.”).
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and a contract is simply two mutual promises spoken with
consideration.47 Contract formation is, from top to bottom, speech.
Moreover, mutual promises do not require a governmental
imprimatur to be contracts objectively—only to be enforceable
contracts.48 Courts interpret the law of contracts to determine
whether the contracts that individuals have already formed are
legally enforceable. The state does not confer on individuals the
capacity to make contracts in the first place. Nor does a contract exist
in suspended animation until, at long last, a duly appointed judge in
final judgment so orders that it come to be. For example, an
exchange of promises to pay compensation in exchange for murder is
a contract, but it is an unenforceable and punishable contract.49 If a
judge declares that a contract is void ab initio, this does not change
the fact that certain people exchanged promises—indeed, the only
way a judge can decide that a contract is void at all is by analyzing
the content and circumstances surrounding speech that really
occurred. A court cannot, by ipse dixit, transform speech into notspeech simply because the contract formed by that speech is contrary
to public policy.
This simple observation—that contract formation is speech and
therefore protected by the First Amendment—has not yet been
recognized.50 Why is uncertain. Perhaps the oversight is due to the
Lochner era’s use of the Due Process Clause as the exclusive textual
hook for the liberty of contract;51 moreover, the First Amendment
had not yet been incorporated.52 Progressives who opposed Lochner,
47. Id. § 2(1)–(3) (“A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in
a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been
made. The person manifesting the intention is the promisor. The person to whom the
manifestation is addressed is the promisee.”); id. § 18 (“Manifestation of mutual assent to an
exchange requires that each party either make a promise or begin or render a performance.”).
48. See id. § 1 (“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”). For its
part, the Supreme Court has never adopted a purely positivist understanding of the nature of
contracts. See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (refusing to defer to
Indiana’s contract law in determining whether an Indiana law, retroactively declaring that a
public contract was never a contract, impaired that contract under the Contracts Clause).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 45, at § 178 (“A promise or
other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides
that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the
circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.”).
50. See supra text accompanying note 7.
51. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923).
52. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the Free Speech Clause
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but who did not want to abandon judicial review of all individual
liberties, rhetorically contrasted Due Process liberty of contract (not
protected by the Constitution) to First Amendment political speech
(protected by the Constitution).53 After the New Deal, a majority
coalition of conservative and liberal thinkers joined the New Deal
chorus that courts should not stand in judgment over popular
economic regulations.54 While there is a strong intuitive appeal for
finding a liberty of contract in the First Amendment’s text, there has
not yet been occasion for doing so. As Martin Krygier observed,
“unearth[ing] hitherto unknown truths about law” is frequently
accomplished by re-examining what is “already familiar . . . so
familiar as to escape notice altogether.”55
Contracts are mutual promises supported by consideration.56
Promises are speech.57 As speech, contract-forming promises are—or
rather, ought to be—presumptively protected by the First
Amendment.58 This syllogism is simple and intuitive. To be sure,
contract formation is a very specific and peculiar type of speech. Not
just any speech can be described as a contract, and fewer contracts
still will rise to the level of enforceability. But nothing in the text of
the First Amendment itself indicates that the “freedom of speech”
does not encompass this unique speech, as it encompasses most other
unique forms of speech.
B. Argument from Precedent:
Contract Formation Is Commercial Speech
The text of the First Amendment can only get us so far, because
the Supreme Court has held that some speech is not protected by the
well after the recognition of the liberty of contract in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589
(1897)).
53. See Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 548 (“During the Lochner era, while they had been
railing against aggressive judicial protection of economic rights, Justices Holmes and Brandeis
had simultaneously argued in favor of aggressive judicial protection of the freedom of speech.
Relying primarily on the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor, Holmes insisted that it is ‘the theory of
our Constitution’ that free speech should be aggressively protected, whereas liberty of contract
should not. Brandeis, by contrast, had relied on the unique centrality of free speech to a wellfunctioning political process. The Framers, he insisted, believed ‘that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.’”).
54. See supra text accompanying note 11.
55. Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 L. & PHIL. 237, 238 (1986).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 45–47.
57. Id.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 41–44.
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Constitution.59 For example, incitement, defamation, and fraud, are
all unprotected speech.60 The freedom of speech has never been
absolute. In the past the Court declared that certain categories of
speech are unprotected because they are valueless.61 Moving away
from this ad hoc value-balancing, the Court now says that speech is
presumptively protected unless there is a historical practice of
denying that speech any protection all.62 There is no such historical
practice with contract formation—Anglo-American courts have
honored and enforced most commercial promises time out of mind.
Practically speaking, the basic common law right to form a contract
has been the rule, and abridgement of this right the exception.63
Therefore, contract formation should be presumptively protected as a
matter of precedent.
This initial conclusion is vindicated by the Supreme Court’s
“commercial speech” precedent. In its commercial speech decisions,
the Court has repeatedly recognized an inseparable relationship
between speech and economic activity by striking down regulations
that restrict commercial advertisements.64 To be sure, the Court has
awarded commercial speech a lower level of judicial scrutiny, and it
is generally wary of striking down economic regulations, even those
burdening speech.65 These cases, however, indicate that the First
Amendment does not merely protect political speech—it also
protects economic speech, such as the right to extend an offer and
acceptance on reasonable terms that do not offend the common
59. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 470.
62. Id. at 468, 472 (“[T]he First Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited’ . . . ‘historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar’ . . . The
First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that
survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself
reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government
outweigh the costs.”).
63. Cf. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923) (“There is, of course, no such
thing as absolute freedom of contract. It is subject to a great variety of restraints. But freedom of
contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and restraint the exception . . .”).
64. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
65. See id. at 562–63 (“Nevertheless, our decisions have recognized ‘the “commonsense”
distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.’ The Constitution
therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression.” (citations omitted)).
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1. A New Deal for Advertising:
Valentine and Commercial Speech
In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Valentine v. Chrestensen,67 stripped away all constitutional
protection for economic speech.68 The Court has subsequently
walked back its position in Valentine and granted greater protection
to economic speech.69 The Court has found it increasingly difficult, if
not untenable, to distinguish between economic and non-economic
speech.70 If the Court is correct that the First Amendment protects
both economic and political speech, this fulsome reading of the Free
Speech Clause all but dictates recognizing a First Amendment liberty
of contract formation.
In Valentine, the owner of a navy submarine, Christensen,
moored the ship at a state pier on the East River of New York City
and distributed handbills advertising a showcase exhibit of the
vessel.71 Christensen was charged under the city sanitary code, which
prohibited the distribution of commercial advertisements on the pier
and permitted only handbills devoted to “information or public
protest.”72 In an extraordinarily brief opinion, the Court held—
without any legal reasoning and without citing to a single authority—
first, that states may not unduly burden the communication of
information and opinion on a public street, and second, that “the
66. Cf. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1975) (“Our question is whether speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction,’ is so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas,’ and from ‘“truth, science, morality,
and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,”‘
that it lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is not.”).
67. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
68. Id. at 54.
69. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 758–59, 762 (overruling Valentine).
70. Id. at 765 (“So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic
decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and
well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if it is
indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also
indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated
or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to
enlighten public decision-making in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of
information does not serve that goal.” (citations omitted)); see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564
U.S. 552, 576 (2011) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
71. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 52–53.
72. Id. at 53.
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Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising.”73 The Court thus created out of thin
air the interpretive distinction between political speech and economic
speech.
Aside from the total lack of historical, precedential, or textual
basis for its distinction between economic and non-economic speech,
the Valentine Court offered no logical justification, either. While it
noted that the state possessed a valid police power interest in the
prevention of handbill clutter on the roads,74 it did not explain why
this valid interest, rather than limiting the scope of commercial
speech freedom, instead entirely divested commercial speech of all
constitutional protection. The Court’s opinion was an imposition of
judicial will apart from even a pretext of legal interpretation.75
The timing of Valentine may offer a clue as to the Court’s
reasoning. Valentine was decided in 1942, five short years after the
Court’s dramatic reversal of key Lochner-era precedents. With the
Court’s definitive rejection of the liberty of contract in West Coast
Hotel in recent view, the decision in Valentine begins to make more
sense. While Christensen did not plead a liberty to form contracts to
exhibit his submarine—only a liberty to spread information about the
submarine exhibition—had the Court held in his favor, they would
have reignited pre-New Deal review of state economic policy. You
can imagine the Justices thinking, “We won this war already,” and
dashing off an unreasoned reversal. Indeed, the opinion was even
written by Justice Owen Roberts, the key vote who secured a
majority in West Coast Hotel. The historical context of the political
struggle over Lochner sheds light on an otherwise mysterious
opinion. But the true motivation of the unanimous Court, led by
Justice Roberts, is unknown.
2. Valentine Reversed: The Right to “Propos[e] a
Commercial Transaction”
A quarter century later, the Court revisited the commercial
speech doctrine in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
73. Id. at 54.
74. Id. at 54–55.
75. Only later did the Court attempt to offer a post hoc rationalization for its distinction. See
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (“There are commonsense differences between
speech that does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction,’ and other varieties.” (citation
omitted)).
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Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. [hereinafter Virginia Pharmacy].76
In Virginia Pharmacy, consumers of prescription drugs sued the state
board that prohibited licensed pharmacists from “publish[ing],
advertis[ing] or promot[ing], directly or indirectly, in any manner
whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or
credit terms . . . for any drugs which may be dispensed only by
prescription.”77 The Court began by overruling Valentine, which
“had been tempered, by later decisions of this Court, to the point that
First Amendment interests in the free flow of price information could
be found to outweigh the countervailing interests of the State.”78
The district court, in reaching its conclusion, did not rely
entirely on Valentine; it also cited Lee Optical79—a Due Process
case—in which the Court upheld a restriction on the advertisement of
prices for eyeglass frames.80 Lee Optical is notorious for its
articulation of a pro forma rational basis review that instructs courts
to uphold virtually any economic regulation from a substantive due
process challenge.81 The Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy
distinguished the case from Lee Optical on the facts, noting that the
“same dangers of abuse and deception” are not present “when the
advertised commodity [is] prescribed by a physician for his
individual patient and [is] dispensed by a licensed pharmacist.”82
This distinction makes sense, but the similarity between Virginia
Pharmacy, a First Amendment case, and Lee Optical, a Due Process
case, was striking—enough to catch the attention of the district
court.83 The Supreme Court ultimately held that the First
Amendment protected the right of the pharmacists to spread pricing
and other commercial information,84 even if the Due Process Clause
76. Id. at 748.
77. Id. at 750.
78. Id. at 755.
79. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
80. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 755–56.
81. See Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487–89 (“The Oklahoma law may exact a needless,
wasteful requirement in many cases . . . . It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction,
and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct
it.”); see also Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 111–12 (Tex. 2015)
(Willett, J., concurring) (“Indeed, federal-style scrutiny is quite unscrutinizing, with many
burdens acing the rational-basis test while flunking the straight-face test . . . . All this explains
why critics charge the test is less ‘rational basis’ than ‘rationalize a basis.’”).
82. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
83. See id. at 755–56.
84. Id. at 762.
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did not.
Unconvinced by the Court’s treatment of Lee Optical, Justice
Rehnquist vigorously dissented. He argued that the holding of Lee
Optical was dispositive, notwithstanding the fact that Lee Optical
was only a Due Process case.85 To Justice Rehnquist, the Court’s
rejection of Lochner-style economic liberty arguments in the Due
Process context was a rejection of them in every context, the First
Amendment included.
Justice Rehnquist went further, arguing that while the First
Amendment protects speech that may have “remote possible effects
of noxious ideologies,” it does not prohibit the regulation of “direct,
active conduct.”86 In other words, there is a constitutional distinction
between speech and conduct87—dialogue and discourse on ideas, and
verbal economic activity.88 In this view, the First Amendment is
designed to protect “public decision-making as to political, social,
and other public issues,” not “the decision of a particular individual
as to whether to purchase one or another kind of shampoo.”89
Deliberation in the halls of Congress is constitutional speech, but
bargaining on the streets of the bazaar is not.
To justify the old Valentine rule, Justice Rehnquist insisted that,
even though many people “regard the choice of shampoo as just as

85. See id. at 783–85.
86. Id. at 789 (quoting Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950)).
87. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (“The line between what is
permissible and not subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to
regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts.”).
88. The Court has held that speech integral to criminal conduct is unprotected. Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949); see United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,
468–69 (2010) (affirming the continuing validity of Giboney). In Giboney, union members
conspired to drive a non-union company out of business, violating a state law that prohibited
economic combinations in restraint of trade. 336 U.S. at 491–92. The unions claimed that their
conspiracy was protected speech. Id. at 494. To be sure, it was speech, but it was also conduct
that was disfavored at common law and arguably malum in se. See id. at 495–97 (holding that
prohibiting restraints on trade is one of the “traditional powers of states” and an unquestionably
constitutional government interest). Therefore, Giboney does not hold, a la Justice Rehnquist in
Virginia Pharmacy, that speech is protected while conduct is not. The distinction between speech
and conduct is too permeable, since every act of speaking, from mere persuasion to incitement to
imminent lawless action, is a speech-act—conduct, by definition. Giboney, rather, respects the
historic police powers of the state to punish criminal acts without any First Amendment
impediment, even if that conduct takes the form of a verbal utterance. Every law that burdens
speech is in some sense regulating conduct. Indeed, if Giboney held that all regulations of speech
that could be characterized as conduct were immune from First Amendment scrutiny, the First
Amendment would be nonjusticiable.
89. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 787.
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important as who may be elected to local, state, or national political
office,” that does not “automatically bring information about
competing shampoos within the protection of the First
Amendment.”90 This is true enough—First Amendment protection
does not turn on whether hearers consider speech important or
unimportant91—but it is also a non sequitur. The First Amendment
presumptively protects all speech, even the most frivolous92—such
as “a ‘merchant’ who goes from door to door ‘selling pots.’”93
Justice Rehnquist saw the intimate connection between
advertising pots and selling them (i.e., forming a contract).94
Advertising and contracting are closely related activities.95 By
protecting commercial advertisements, the Court handicapped the
states, limiting their previously unconstrained economic regulatory
powers granted to them by Lee Optical.
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy only announced an
intermediate level of scrutiny, maintaining the distinction between
political and economic speech.96 In a fascinating and prescient line,
the Court based this differing treatment on “‘commonsense’
differences between speech that . . . propos[es] a commercial

90. Id.
91. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–72 (2010).
92. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1970) (holding that a jacket with the
words “Fuck the Draft” is protected speech); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 528 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Wholly neutral futilities, of course, come under the protection of
free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s sermons.”); see also United States v. Alvarez,
132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (“[O]ne of the costs of the First Amendment is that it protects the
speech we detest as well as the speech we embrace.”).
93. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 788.
94. See id. at 783, 788 (“[T]he Court necessarily adopts a rule which cannot be limited
merely to dissemination of price alone . . . . [T]he protections of that Amendment do not apply to
a ‘“merchant” who goes from door to door “selling pots.”).
95. See Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV.
1153, 1175–76 (2012) (“It was long ago suggested that there is good reason to treat commercial
speech (at least narrow commercial speech) as simply part of the transaction, but not as speech, or
at least not as speech covered by the First Amendment. The notion that the regulated commercial
speech is simply part of the commercial transaction . . . [is] broadly based on the nature of all
commercial speech, whose essential (and generally only) function is to enable or assist
effectuation of the secondary process.” (citations omitted)); Samuel R. Olken, The Business of
Expression: Economic Liberty, Political Factions and the Forgotten First Amendment Legacy of
Justice George Sutherland, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 249, 255 (2002) (“[Justice] Sutherland
implicitly perceived [a] connection between the rights of business (essentially ones of property)
and those of expression, and so he imbued his analysis of the First Amendment with his
understanding of economic substantive due process and equal protection.”).
96. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770–73.
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transaction, and other varieties” of speech.97 Since “speech
proposing a commercial transaction” could describe both
advertisement and contract formation, the Court was only a
hairsbreadth away from recognizing a liberty of contract formation.
Without expressly using the term “liberty of contract,” the Court all
but held that the First Amendment protects contract-forming
promises.
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,98 the Court reaffirmed Virginia Pharmacy.99 Justice
Rehnquist dissented again—this time directly citing Lochner.100 As
in his Virginia Pharmacy dissent, Justice Rehnquist emphasized the
connection between protecting commercial speech and protecting the
liberty of contract.101 But Justice Rehnquist took his criticism further,
attacking the idea that the First Amendment protects a “marketplace
of ideas.”102 While he conceded that “an important objective of the
First Amendment is to foster the free flow of information”—
including commercial information—nevertheless, just as the
invisible hand of the market will not always lead to “optimum
economic decisions in the commercial market,” in the same way,
“the marketplace of ideas is [not] free from market imperfections.”103
For the same reason that a state has to be free to regulate (even
arbitrarily) the perceived imperfections of the market,104 so the state
must have unrestrained power to regulate commercial speech in the
marketplace of ideas.105
3. Virginia Pharmacy Extended:
The Right to Communicate by Contract
Recently, the Supreme Court reexamined the commercial speech
doctrine in Sorell v. IMS Health Inc.106 In that case, Vermont
97. Id. at 771 n.24 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
98. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
99. Id. at 561–64.
100. Id. at 589.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 592.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
105. Cf. Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 WIS.
L. REV. 265, 294 n.161 (1987) (“[C]ontemporary proponents of economic substantive due
process often argue that the ‘marketplace of ideas’ rationale for free speech also helps justify the
free economic market and the rights underlying it.”).
106. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
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prohibited the “sale, disclosure, and use” of pharmacy records that
reveal prescribing practices of individual doctors.107 This information
empowered pharmaceutical manufacturers to more effectively
market their product, a process called “detailing.”108 However, the
Vermont legislature regulated this practice out of a fear that it would
help large, branded pharmaceutical companies who could afford to
engage in detailing, leading to under-prescription of cheaper, generic
pharmaceuticals.109
The Court held that prohibiting the “sale, disclosure, and use”110
of records for detailing was an unconstitutional “content- and
speaker- based restriction[]” on free speech.111 The Court explained:
The statute . . . disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a
particular content. More than that, the statute disfavors
specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.
As a result of these content- and speaker-based rules,
detailers cannot obtain prescriber-identifying information,
even though the information may be purchased or acquired
by other speakers with diverse purposes and viewpoints.112
Critically, the law did not merely regulate disclosure of information
(advertising)—it also regulated the sale and purchase of information
(contracting). The Court thus recognized both advertisement and
contract as manners of speaking covered by the First Amendment.113
The law in Sorrell failed First Amendment scrutiny because it
prohibited sales and purchases in the market to stop the free flow of
107. Id. at 557.
108. Id. at 552.
109. Id. at 560–61, 564–65.
110. Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 563.
112. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
113. Opponents of commercial speech protections have recognized this shift. See Seth E.
Mermin & Samantha K. Graff, The First Amendment and Public Health, at Odds, 39 AM. J.L. &
MED. 298, 303–04 (2013) (“A key strategy of industry advocates has been to try to take business
practices that were never considered expressive and to re-characterize them as protected
speech . . . . If companies increasingly consider everything that they do to be marketing (and they
do), and the courts increasingly consider marketing to be protected speech, then the portion of
business activity that government is able to regulate will be significantly diminished—and the
revived laissez-faire dream of the Lochner era will, to a significant extent, have been realized.”
(citation omitted)). But see Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech or
Resurrecting Lochner?, 2011 CATO. SUP. CT. REV. 129, 144 (2011) (identifying the constitutional
speech, not as the contract transferring the commercial information, but as the subsequent
advertisement of that commercial information that would have been broadcasted but for the
regulatory burden preventing acquisition of the commercial information).
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commercial information and to pick winners and losers in the
marketplace.114 Because the regulation was aimed at preventing
certain information—”prescriber-identifying information” owned by
pharmaceutical companies—from entering the market, it was
content-based.115 Because the regulation sought to strangle “sale”
(i.e., communication) of this information in order to privilege one
manufacturer in the marketplace (i.e., one speaker) over another, it
was speaker-based.116 Therefore, because the regulation
(1) prohibited the formation of contracts that communicate
information, and (2) prohibited the formation of contracts in order to
privilege one market participant communicating information over
another, it was an abridgement of free speech.
Using this reasoning, the regulation in Sorrell may be directly
analogized to a price control. Price controls prohibit the formation of
a contract because of the prices they communicate. Prices are signals
by the speaking party (the promisor), communicating to the listening
party (the promisee) the amount of value that the speaking party
places on the scarce resource that is the subject of the transaction.117
This pricing conversation, culminating in a final agreement on a
contract price, disseminates this information (private perceptions of
relative value) into the market at large.118 Therefore, all price
controls—forbidding contracts at certain prices—target commercial
information. Not every contract is designed to alienate information
that is held as intellectual property—as in Sorrell—but every
114. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–64.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See generally, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV.
519, 526 (1945) (“Fundamentally, in a system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is
dispersed among many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different
people . . . The whole acts as one market, not because any of its members survey the whole field,
but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through many
intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all. The mere fact that there is one
price for any commodity—or rather that local prices are connected in a manner determined by the
cost of transport, etc.—brings about the solution which . . . might have been arrived at by one
single mind possessing all the information which is in fact dispersed among all the people
involved in the process.” (emphasis added)); see also supra text accompanying note 70 (citing
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1975)
(“So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources
in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions . . . . To this end, the
free flow of commercial information is indispensable . . . to the proper allocation of resources in a
free enterprise system . . . .” (citations omitted))).
118. See F.A. Hayek, supra note 117.
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contract has a simultaneous function of alienating property and
communicating price information to market participants.119
A price control, then, is a content-based regulation of speech.
Price controls smother the frank conversation that naturally
characterizes the bazaar. Ordinarily the formation of a contract
involves a debate between two people, each of them insisting that
their own perception of supply and demand ought to determine the
value of the property being exchanged. In conducting this debate,
contracting parties will point to prices that have been communicated
by other similar contracts and argue that those prices reflect the true
and accurate price of a fair bargain. Price controls silence this
exchange of commercial information, inserting a government censor
into the commercial dialogue in order to ensure that individuals only
communicate government-approved pricing information.
Moreover, price controls are designed to favor one speaker in
the market over another. Minimum wages, for example, are designed
to coerce employers to communicate a price at the minimum wage or
above, even though the employer privately believes that the
minimum price overvalues the offered labor. Minimum wages are
also designed to coerce low-skilled laborers—those who would
otherwise want to work at low wages—into demanding at least the
minimum wage for their labor, even though they privately agree with
the employer that the minimum wage overvalues their work.
Minimum wages pick winning and losing speakers in the
marketplace. They censor the economic speech of employers who
need low-skill labor, privileging wealthy employers who can survive
without low-skill labor. They also censor low-skilled laborers who
would voluntarily contract their labor at an agreed price, privileging
higher-skilled workers who can offer more value for the same wage.
Minimum wages, like all price controls, silence speech because the
government disfavors the pricing information communicated and the
speakers communicating it.120
119. Some members of the Court have attempted to imbue this distinction with constitutional
significance. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (plurality
opinion) (“[T]he State retains less regulatory authority when its commercial speech restrictions
strike at ‘the substance of the information communicated’ rather than the ‘commercial aspect of
[it]—with offerors communicating offers to offerees.’”).
120. Commercial promises have two functions: (1) pledging a conditional alienation of
property, and (2) communicating price information. Price controls target the more obviously
communicative aspect of contract formation. However, a pledge is no less “speech” than a price
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Though Sorrell did not inaugurate a free-standing First
Amendment liberty of contract formation, its reasoning makes price
control legislation at least suspect, if not presumptively
unconstitutional.121 In a curious line, the Court modified Justice
Holmes’ Lochner dissent, saying, “The Constitution ‘does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.’ It does enact the First
Amendment.”122 In other words, the Constitution’s Due Process
Clause may not protect contracting for the sale of information, but
the First Amendment clearly protects economic speech, whether in
the form of advertisement or sale. This way of thinking blazes a trail
for explicitly recognizing and protecting the right to form a
contract.123
Dissenting in Sorrell, Justice Breyer carried the torch of Justice
Rehnquist’s Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hudson dissents,
arguing that the Court, in striking down a regulation prohibiting the
signal, despite the fact that it does not serve a primarily informational function. Indeed, it is
impossible to fully distinguish regulations that target the underlying substance of a contract (the
alienated property) from regulations that target the information communicated by contract terms
(the price), since a speaker cannot contract at $5 rather than $10 without alienating the underlying
property at the agreed-upon price. The “content” of a contract is not just the price; it is the whole
property that is the subject of the contractual conversation. For further discussion of the
mysterious relationship between commercial information and property, see generally GEORGE
GILDER, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER: THE INFORMATION THEORY OF CAPITALISM AND HOW IT IS
REVOLUTIONIZING OUR WORLD (2013) (contending that material wealth finds its genesis and
substance in the creation of new information).
However, that does not mean that every aspect of contract law should be reviewed under
heightened scrutiny. There are many content-neutral default rules of contract that set the terms of
contracting without regard for the underlying content of the transaction. These rules incidentally
burden speech, but they do not target speech in a discriminatory way. Cf. United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral
regulations that incidentally burden speech); see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990) (rejecting heightened scrutiny for neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally
burden free exercise of religion).
121. But see Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1, 11 (2000) (arguing that the Court protects commercial speech because it “is highly relevant to
the formation of democratic public opinion,” empowering citizens to “organize politically to
advocate within public discourse for government price controls”); Henry N. Butler & Larry E.
Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 163, 183
(1994) (“[E]ven if the Court is unwilling to second-guess legislative decisions regarding
economic activity, it is willing to ensure that the political process leading to those decisions is
robust and well-informed . . . . Thus, protecting speech on constitutional grounds differs from
employing constitutional arguments to protect the underlying economic activity.”).
122. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (citation omitted).
123. But see Samp, supra note 113, at 148 (“Nonetheless, by relying on ‘burdens’ imposed on
the speech of drug manufacturers, rather than on the direct and substantial regulation of IMS
Health’s efforts to disseminate physician-identifying information, the majority left itself open to
criticism that its First Amendment standards are too open-ended.”).
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sale of information, was voiding “ordinary commercial or regulatory
legislation that affects speech in less direct ways.”124 Refusing to
acknowledge that the sale of detailer information was
constitutionally cognizable speech, Justice Breyer argued that using
the First Amendment to protect sales contracts would resurrect
Lochner review of economic regulation.125 Justice Breyer saw that
the First Amendment could be used to perform an end-run around
West Coast Hotel and Lee Optical.126 He saw what Justice Roberts
and the Valentine Court saw in 1942.
III. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROTECTING
CONTRACT FORMATION
There is a strong case from text and precedent that the First
Amendment protects a liberty of contract formation. Even if this
right is protected by the Constitution, however, that does not
necessarily mean that the U.S. Supreme Court should review
legislation infringing it. Recognizing a First Amendment contract
freedom would not reverse the reasoning of West Coast Hotel, but it
could reverse the outcome, restoring judicial review of economic
regulations that abridge contract formation. This would herald a sea
change in constitutional law. Because of the stakes involved in this
potentially dramatic re-engagement of the Court, we must turn to
constitutional theory for aid in answering a second-order question of
judicial prudence.
A. Originalist Justification:
Need for Liberal Construction
As an ostensibly neutral theory of constitutional interpretation,
originalism provides a powerful normative justification for any
proposed constitutional doctrine.127 Originalism is a “family of views
that cluster around two central ideas, the fixation thesis and the
contribution thesis.”128 The fixation thesis is the idea that “original
124. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 584.
125. Id. at 591–92, 602–03.
126. See id. at 584–85.
127. Cf. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 35 (1971) (“The Supreme Court’s constitutional role appears to be justified only if the
Court applies principles that are neutrally derived, defined and applied.”).
128. Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 3536 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds.,
2011).
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meaning was fixed, or determined, at the time each provision of the
Constitution was framed and ratified.”129 All originalists agree on
this point, making it the “core idea” of originalism.130 The
contribution thesis is the idea that “the original meaning of the
Constitution should make a substantial contribution to the content of
constitutional doctrine.”131
Originalists disagree about how much of a contribution this
original meaning should make.132 Some originalists believe that
“each and every rule of constitutional law must be identical to the
original meaning of some provision of the Constitution.”133 Other
originalists hold that constitutional doctrines should be allowed to
supplement vague provisions, provided they do not “contradict the
original meaning.”134 Still others allow for circumstances where
original meaning is trumped by other considerations, such as the role
of precedent and stare decisis, even though “original meaning should
govern in cases of first impression.”135
The perceived virtue of originalism is that it constrains judges
with a historical method of interpretation136—a virtue that is
particularly important here, given that any recognition of a First
Amendment contract freedom would invariably provoke charges that
the judiciary has willfully super-imposed a laissez-faire economic
theory on the Constitution and the nation.
There are two forms of originalist theory: original intentions
originalism (“Old Originalism”) and original public meaning
originalism (“New Originalism”). Old Originalism holds that judges
who interpret constitutional provisions ought to be constrained by the
intentions of the Framers.137 New Originalism considers, instead,
129. Id. at 33.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 35.
132. See id. at 34–35.
133. Id. at 34.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Bork, supra note 127, at 17 (“There appear to be two proper methods of deriving
rights from the Constitution. The first is to take from the document rather specific values that text
or history show the framers actually to have intended and which are capable of being translated
into principled rules . . . . The second method derives rights from governmental processes
established by the Constitution.”).
137. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 603 (2004)
(“[O]riginalists often did speak in terms of attempting ‘to understand the Constitution according
to the intention of those who conceived it,’ even though they might simultaneously renounce the

80

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:57

what the Framers and the ratifying public would have understood the
words to mean at the time.138 New Originalism recognizes a
distinction between “interpretation” and “construction”—judges
interpret a text to determine whether it provides a specific rule or an
open ended principle, and if the text mandates the application of a
broad principle, judges construct doctrines to give the most faithful
effect to that principle.139
The originalist inquiry into the First Amendment begins,
unfortunately, with a poverty of historical evidence. According to
Judge Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, “The Framers’ commentary
on freedom of speech focuses entirely on the importance of free
speech to self-government.”140 James Madison, for example, “valued
the freedom of speech solely as necessary to protect the right of
citizens to criticize government officials.”141 The controversy over
the Alien and Sedition Acts “reinforced the focus [of the First
Amendment] on political speech,” as Madison “stressed the
importance of the freedoms of speech and the press in assuring that
the electorate receives a continuous flow of accurate information
about political candidates.”142 A myopic historical inquiry leads to a
surprising conclusion: “the people involved with the drafting or
ratifying of the first amendment” were only concerned with
view that interpreters should attempt to open up the heads of the founders and ‘look inside for the
truest account of their brain states at the moment that the texts were created.’ Perhaps more
precisely, this form of originalism can be said to be concerned with the ‘scope beliefs’ and
‘counterfactual scope beliefs’ of the founders regarding ‘the specific legal implications or effects
of (correctly interpreted) constitutional provisions.’” (citations omitted)).
138. Id. at 609–10 (“[T]he new originalism is focused less on the concrete intentions of
individual drafters of constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that was
adopted . . . . This is not to say the history of the drafting process is irrelevant—it may provide
important clues as to how the text was understood at the time and the meaningful choices that
particular textual language embodied—but it is not uniquely important to the recovery of the
original meaning of the Constitution.”).
139. Id. at 611 (“The point of [new] originalist inquiry is not to ask Madison what he would
do if he were a justice on the Supreme Court hearing the case at issue. The point is to determine
what principle Madison and his contemporaries adopted, and then to figure out whether and how
that principle applies to the current case.”).
140. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV.
627, 632 (1990) (“Thomas Jefferson wrote: ‘The people are the only censors of their governors:
and even their errors will tend to keep these to the true principles of their institution . . . . The
basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep
that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without
newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the
latter.’” (citation omitted)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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“politically oriented speech.”143 While it is true that “[t]he Framers
and their contemporaries would have encountered commercial
speech in a number of [] contexts,” this fact does not tell us whether
they specifically intended to protect commercial speech.144
Perhaps the lack of historical evidence means that the First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech at all. But Kozinski
and Banner maintain that this argument “proves too much.”145 After
all, “[t]he Framers never expressed an interest in protecting literature
either,” but nobody questions the fact that literature is “speech.”146
Nor did the Framers ever distinguish between content-based and
content-neutral restrictions on speech, but this distinction is
fundamental to First Amendment law.
Because there simply is not enough historical evidence to
support an intentions-based originalist approach to the First
Amendment—or, for that matter, any strict originalist approach that
requires maximal recourse to history—originalists have “fairly
unanimously” stopped trying.147 Robert Bork, originalist par
excellence, conceded, “The framers seem to have had no coherent
theory of free speech and appear not to have been overly concerned
with the subject.”148 Bork—to the agreement of scholars—
concluded, “The first amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights,
appears to have been a hastily drafted document upon which little
thought was expended.”149
Would James Madison have thought (or did he think) that
contract formation is “speech”? We may never know. Fortunately,
New Originalism has a solution. New Originalism asks, instead,
“What principle did James Madison enact by using the word
‘speech’”?150 The word “speech” meant then, as it does today, any
intelligible utterance.151 This broad word enacts a broad principle:
143. Id.
144. See id. at 632–33.
145. Id. at 633.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Compare Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 795–98 (2011) (holding that
there was a historical practice at the time of the founding of tolerating violent entertainment), with
id. at 816–21 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that changes in technology make the media of
interactive video games meaningfully different from the forms of media that were intentionally
protected by the Framers—and therefore less worthy of protection).
151. See Samuel Johnson, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 813–14 (10th ed.
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the right to utter in any manner (speaking, writing, or acting
expressively), for whatever purpose (political or commercial), and in
whatever context (private or public). Having derived this broad
principle of “speech,” New Originalism commands judges to
construct doctrines that give proper effect to it.
Whether applying Old or New Originalism, both methodologies
appear resigned to an expansive interpretation of the Free Speech
Clause. This interpretation can accommodate the judicial
construction of a liberty of contract formation, offering a prudential
basis for recognizing the right.
B. Traditionalist Justification:
Need for Deeply Rooted Liberty
A theory of constitutional traditionalism offers an even more
compelling case for recognizing and protecting a First Amendment
liberty of contract formation.152 “Traditionalism” is an approach to
constitutional law that takes our legal practices and precedent as
given, and only elevates something to the status of constitutional law
if it is both foundational and fundamental to our legal order. The
traditionalist approach is best exemplified by Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s decision in Washington v. Glucksberg.153
The Glucksberg approach to recognizing new constitutional
rights follows two steps. First, the Court carefully defines the
proposed constitutional right, searching for a narrow level of
generality.154 In Glucksberg, for example, defendants sought a
declaration from the Court of a constitutional right to assisted
suicide.155 Rather than broadly describing it as “the right to die,” the
Court described it as “[the] right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so,” a narrower right that more
closely fit the relief sought by the parties in that particular case.156
1792) (“To SPEAK . . . . 1. To utter articulate sounds; or express thoughts by words . . . . 4. To
exhibit . . . . SPEAKER . . . . 2. One that speaks in any particular manner . . . . SPEECH . . . . 2.
Language; words considered as expressing thoughts . . . . 4. Any thing spoken.”).
152. What I call a “theory” of traditionalism is more of a philosophical disposition of judicial
respect for history and practice. See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and
the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665 (1997) (praising the historical reasoning
of Washington v. Glucksberg as a prudent traditionalist approach to judging).
153. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
154. Id. at 720.
155. Id. at 722.
156. Id. at 723.
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After carefully describing the right, the Court considers whether that
right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and is
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed.”157 This ensures that any
newly recognized constitutional right is rooted in our national
experience and rises to a certain level of normative importance. The
Glucksberg approach, while framed in the context of substantive due
process, represents a wise, objective approach to individual rights
jurisprudence in general, focusing on experience and practical needs
rather than ideology. If a right “passes” the Glucksberg test, the
Court has less reason to fear stifling democratic debate on contested
issues,158 inflicting unintended, socially-disruptive consequences,159
or imposing its policy preferences on the nation.160
Applying the traditionalist approach to the First Amendment
liberty of contract formation, the Court would begin by seeking a
careful description of the newly proposed right. The right must not
be an abstract or ambiguous concept—”economic liberty,” “the right
to make a living,” or even “the liberty of contract.” It must be a very
specific freedom: the right to speak a promise, which itself includes
the right to strike a bargain through an exchange of promises.
Describing the right in this way achieves the same low level of
generality as the right described by the Court in Glucksberg.161
The right to form a contract is also “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition.”162 The common law of contracts,
protecting and enforcing mutual promises supported by
consideration, is ancient.163 While every state regulates contract
formation, state law generally favors enforceability.164 The right to
form a contract, while never treated as absolute, has been recognized
157. Id. at 721.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 732–33 (“[T]he State may fear that permitting assisted suicide will start it
down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia. The Court of Appeals struck
down Washington’s assisted-suicide ban only ‘as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who
wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors.’ Washington
insists, however, that the impact of the court’s decision will not and cannot be so limited.”).
160. Id. at 720.
161. Here, it is the right to speak a promise, which itself includes the right to strike a bargain
through an exchange of promises. In Glucksberg, it was “[the] right to commit suicide which
itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.” Id. at 723.
162. Id. at 720.
163. See supra text accompanying note 12.
164. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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as fundamental and protected as sacred in American and English
society time out of mind.
It is harder to say whether this right is “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[it was] sacrificed.”165 This is a philosophical inquiry designed to test
the normative importance of the right. The right of contract
formation is undeniably important to a free society, because
contracting is the primary way in which private property is
voluntarily alienated. Freedom to contract ensures that resources can
be efficiently distributed to others who have a need for it, that
distribution is positive-sum for all parties in privity and Pareto
optimal for society, and that individual incentives are aligned toward
alienation rather than accumulation and concomitant decay.
Contracting is not the only method of economic distribution, nor
should it be. Market failures can incentivize contracts with negative
externalities, and positive-sum contracts, while achieving efficient
allocations, may nevertheless leave some members of the community
in a state of destitution. In these situations, alienation by gratuitous
donation, regulation that internalizes negative externalities, and even
coerced transfer payments may achieve important and alternative
values that are exogenous to the world of contracting. Nevertheless,
contract formation is vital to the maintenance and growth of free
communities and nations. In this sense, it is “implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.”166
But contracting is more than dollar signs and distribution
networks. It is a uniquely human activity that is essential to human
flourishing.167 When people contract, they shape the world around
them, accomplishing by a word a normative transformation of their
environment. As soon as A says to B, “I will give you my bicycle for
your skateboard,” A has altered the nature of the bicycle. It was once
theirs. No longer—A has now clouded his title to the bicycle by

165. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
166. Id.
167. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 259 (1882)
(“I was not long in accomplishing the job, when the dear lady put into my hand two silver halfdollars. To understand the emotion which swelled my heart as I clasped this money, realizing that
I had no master who could take it from me—that it was mine—that my hands were my own, and
could earn more of the precious coin—one must have been in some sense himself a slave . . . . I
was not only a freeman but a free-working man, and no master Hugh stood ready at the end of the
week to seize my hard earnings.”).
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creating the contingency of a possible acceptance. If B accepts, the
bicycle’s title transfers, permanently.
Promises are tools, possessed only by humans, by which people
leave a dint in the reality they inhabit. This impression, however, is
made with modesty, vulnerability, and honesty. Person A does not
throw his bicycle at B or take B’s skateboard. Person A begins by
offering an exchange—accepting, before any response by B is given,
the possibility of rejection—and places his integrity as a person on
the line by announcing ahead of time his commitment to honor his
word. Contracting is a uniquely virtuous and communitarian
expression of individual autonomy. If this basic right, this profound
social activity, were ever extinguished, it would be said of that
“society” that “neither liberty nor justice . . . exist.”168
A traditionalist approach to constitutional theory therefore
justifies recognizing a First Amendment liberty of contract
formation. This is highly significant, because judicial review of
economic regulations—particularly price controls—is typically
viewed as the epitome of unrestrained judicial activism.169 But
traditionalist theory pierces through the New Deal rhetoric and
demonstrates that recognizing this economic freedom is in fact a
modest step of constitutional interpretation.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TEXTUAL VEHICLES FOR PROTECTING
CONTRACT FORMATION
A First Amendment liberty of contract formation is guaranteed
by the First Amendment text and implied by the U.S. Supreme
Court’s commercial speech precedent. Two families of modern
constitutional theory—originalism and traditionalism—justify
judicial review of legislative infringements. But notwithstanding its
textual, precedential, and theoretical justifications, some may charge
that the First Amendment is primarily about political liberty and is
therefore a poor textual vehicle for recognizing a right that is purely
commercial in nature.170 To address this criticism, this section
168. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
169. See supra text accompanying note 11.
170. Reza R. Dibadj, The Political Economy of Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 913, 924
(2007) (“Regardless of where one stands on the regulatory debate, however, ‘[o]ne needn’t hold
any particular hierarchy of values to think that the free speech clause is one of the oddest places
the framers could have chosen to constrain governmental abridgement of economic liberty.’”
(citation omitted)).
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analyzes whether recognizing a right of contract formation under
another constitutional clause would be perceived as more legitimate.
A. Due Process and the Problem of Judicial Activism
The Fifth Amendment provides, “nor shall any person . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”171
This clause is rooted in Magna Carta’s guarantee of “the law of the
land,” and the Supreme Court has periodically interpreted it to
provide a minimum level of constitutional protection against
arbitrary restrictions of unenumerated rights.172 Under the theory of
substantive due process, legislation that deprives individuals of life,
liberty, or property without rational justification cannot be described
as “law,” even if it is passed in accordance with all constitutional
procedure.173
Recognizing a liberty of contract formation through the Due
Process Clause would not provide any comparative advantages to the
First Amendment. First, after the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges174
overruled Glucksberg, there is now no longer any neutral, principled
limit on substantive due process.175 Recognizing a liberty of contract
formation under the Due Process Clause would first require
articulating an overarching, intelligible principle of review.176
Second, because the word “liberty” in the Constitution is very broad,
judges applying the liberty of contract formation may, at a later date,
decide to interpret the liberty at a higher level of generality. This
judicial expansion could transform the liberty of contract formation
into a free-wheeling judicial review of all economic regulations177—
171. U.S. CONST. amend V.
172. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 757 (Souter, J., concurring).
173. See, Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Why Popular Sovereignty Requires the Due Process
of Law to Challenge “Irrational or Arbitrary” Statutes, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 13) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2765131. (“[L]ike [Justice] Chase [in Calder v.
Bull], [Justice] Marshall [in M’Culloch v. Maryland] identifies a law ‘for the accomplishment of
objects not entrusted to the government’ as ‘an act’ that is ‘not the law of the land,’ or simply not
law.”).
174. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
175. Id. at 2602.
176. See generally Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise
of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283 (2012) (defending the logic and coherence of
substantive due process review without relying on Glucksberg).
177. The right to contract formation would have a narrower scope than Lochner. Cf. Albert P.
Mauro, Jr., Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate
Sheep’s Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1931, 1955 (1992) (observing that the right to economic
speech is narrower than the right to work); see also Sean P. Costello, Strange Brew: The State of
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the very kind of judicial activism that the Court condemned in Lee
Optical.178 Third, there is simply no appetite on the Supreme Court
for returning to Lochner.179
B. Privileges or Immunities and the Problem of Comprehensibility
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.”180 The Supreme Court in the
Slaughter-House Cases181 held that this clause protects a small batch
of unenumerated rights.182 However, recent scholarship has found
that the original drafters of the amendment intended for the clause to
secure against the states the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
as well as other fundamental, unenumerated rights.183
The liberty to contract was fundamental to the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, making the Privileges or Immunities Clause
a prime alternative text for recognizing a liberty of contract
formation.184 But reversing the Slaughter-House Cases and
Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 744–45 (1997) (“This is not a return to Lochner. Unlike substantive
due process, it [commercial speech] facilitates rather than frustrates majority will . . . facilitating
the communication process and ultimately promoting self-government.”).
178. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The day is gone
when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”).
179. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (invoking Lochner as
a byword for illicit judicial engagement).
180. U.S. CONST amend. XIV § 1, cl. 2.
181. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
182. See id. at 78. But see Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HARV. L. REV. 26, 123 n.327 (2000) (“Virtually no serious modern scholar—left, right, or
center—thinks this a plausible reading of the Amendment.”).
183. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 182, at 123 (“[T]he Privileges or Immunities Clause suggests
a method for finding fundamental rights that is less Court-centered, and admirably so. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not exhaustively list all the privileges and immunities of American
citizenship, but it presupposes that such fundamental rights are catalogued elsewhere in
documents that the American people have broadly ratified, formally or informally. In the eyes of
those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal Bill of Rights was one of
these catalogues, a compilation of fundamental rights that the Amendment would henceforth
guarantee (‘incorporate’) against [sic] states. But the Bill of Rights was not the only epistemic
source of guidance . . . . [T]he Privileges or Immunities Clause would invite the Court to canvass
nonjudicial legal sources . . . as critical sources of epistemic guidance.”). But see McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 834 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing doubt that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects unenumerated rights).
184. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 91 (Field, J., dissenting) (“[T]he act of Congress
known as the Civil Rights Act . . . was framed and adopted upon a construction of the thirteenth
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reinvigorating the Privileges or Immunities Clause would replicate
some of the same problems generated by substantive due process.
First, there would be a problem of placing principled limits on
judicial activism. Even if the Court held that the clause protects only
those liberties considered fundamental at the time of ratification—
thereby constraining the Court with the objective, neutral standard of
history—it is hard to see the Court stopping at a liberty of contract
formation. Lochner could be reborn in its entirety.
There is another problem with the Clause—one that is not
theoretical, but “pragmatic.” To be blunt, nobody knows what the
phrase “privileges or immunities” means anymore. This was a legal
term of art that has since been evacuated from the American
vocabulary. If the Supreme Court suddenly restarts judicial review of
legislative limits on contract formation—striking down minimum
wage laws, for example—there will surely be a public outcry. It will
be difficult for judges, lawyers, and outside observers to explain to
the public why this long-lost clause of the Constitution has suddenly
returned from the legal grave to invalidate popular economic
regulations. Simply reciting, “Contract formation was a privilege or
immunity of citizenship at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification,” probably will not cut it in the court of public opinion.
This is an unprincipled reason to reject the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as an alternative textual vehicle. It is not
theoretical; indeed, is anti-theoretical. But the Court must be prudent.
The public will understand that the First Amendment protects their
right to speak a promise long before they understand that making
promises is a historical “privilege or immunity.” This point should
not be lightly passed over, either. The Supreme Court stressed in
West Coast Hotel that the Due Process Clause nowhere speaks about
a “freedom of contract.”185 This kind of folksy observation matters to
amendment, giving to its language a similar breadth . . . . Its first section declares that all
persons . . . ‘of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery, or
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall have the same right in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as enjoyed by white citizens.’” (emphasis added)).
185. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“In each case the violation
alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of
contract. What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks
of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law.”).
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the sovereign citizenry. Of course the Constitution will be more
complex in application than its plain language might suggest, but
complexity in the law is the enemy of public acceptance. And surely
one of the goals of any legal system, be it common law, statutory, or
constitutional, is to obtain and to proudly bear the approval of
society.
C. The Ninth Amendment and
the Problem of Historical Practice
The Ninth Amendment provides, “The enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”186 The Ninth Amendment
offers the weakest textual vehicle for recognizing a liberty of
contract formation.
As with Due Process and Privileges or Immunities, there is the
same problem of judicial activism. In interpreting the Ninth
Amendment’s open text, why would the Court stop at the right of
contract formation? The Ninth Amendment also faces a dramatic
precedent problem. Since its inception, the Ninth Amendment has
never been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be a font of
substantive rights.187
Professor Randy Barnett makes a compelling historical case that
the Ninth Amendment protects natural rights by creating a
“presumption of liberty,”188 and some Justices on the Supreme Court
have looked to the Ninth Amendment as a possible source of
unenumerated rights.189 However, the Court has thus far treated the
Ninth Amendment as an unenforceable “ink blot” in the
Constitution.190 Overcoming this weight of precedent would be
186. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
187. See, e.g., Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 537 (6th Cir. 1991). See generally Seth
Rokosky, Denied and Disparaged: Applying the “Federalist” Ninth Amendment, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 275 (2010) (detailing the various theories of the Ninth Amendment).
188. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Not the Constitution in Exile, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 669 n.3 (2006); see also generally Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution
Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2012) (arguing that the Due Process
Clause, Privileges or Immunities Clause, and Ninth Amendment protect unenumerated economic
rights).
189. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
190. See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1,
80 (2006) (“When Robert Bork compared the Ninth Amendment to an inkblot, he violated John
Marshall’s famous dictum that ‘[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is
intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words
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extremely difficult.
For these reasons, neither the Due Process Clause, Privileges or
Immunities Clause, nor the Ninth Amendment provide a superior,
more legitimizing textual alternative to the First Amendment for
recognizing the liberty of contract formation.191
V. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that the liberty to form a contract is
secured by the text of the First Amendment, is implicit in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence, is justified by
reference to originalist and traditionalist theory, and finds the most
appropriate textual vehicle in the First Amendment. On careful
reflection, the legal and theoretical case for recognizing this right is
powerful. Moreover, recognizing a federal contract freedom would
solve a historical and constitutional paradox—the fact that contract
freedom, while fundamental to the Framers of the Constitution,
currently receives no legal protection from the Court.
Despite the various and sundry arguments in favor of
recognizing this constitutional liberty, no court has yet
acknowledged its existence.192 How can that be? Earlier in this
Article I suggested that this could merely be the product of historical
accident.193 Though it is quite an accident. I suspect that more is
going on—that the fear and loathing that surrounds Lochner, the
great sin of judicial activism, has closed the legal mind on the subject
of constitutional economic rights.194
For some, Lochner was not wrong merely because it found a
right that the text of the Constitution did not actually secure—it was
require it.’ Still, Bork was on to something, for until quite recently the Ninth Amendment has
been the Rorschach test of constitutional theory.” (citation omitted)).
191. This conclusion, however, is not meant to deny or disparage the rich and varied
scholarship supporting a theory of unenumerated economic rights grounded in one or more of
these clauses.
192. See Barnett, supra note 189. But the Court has come awfully close. See supra notes 120–
122.
193. See supra notes 50–55.
194. See Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 480, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, J.,
concurring) (“America’s cowboy capitalism was long ago disarmed by a democratic process
increasingly dominated by powerful groups with economic interests antithetical to competitors
and consumers. And the courts, from which the victims of burdensome regulation sought
protection, have been negotiating the terms of surrender since the 1930s . . . . Rational basis
review means property is at the mercy of the pillagers. The constitutional guarantee of liberty
deserves more respect—a lot more.”).
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wrong because it transgressed the Progressive political agenda of the
New Deal.195 Lochner’s defeat in West Coast Hotel and Lee Optical
was thus more than a modification of substantive due process
doctrine; it was a wholesale repudiation of the very idea that judges
can or should review any regulation of the marketplace, even when
that regulation is patently arbitrary.196 Under this way of thinking,
even orthodox economic liberties like commercial speech are suspect
because those activities are of a lower order of being.197
There is a real modern hostility toward economic liberty.198
Perhaps it represents a crass pre-commitment to anti-capitalist
ideology. Maybe it is a recognition, with Professor Ackerman, that
the New Deal produced an extra-Article V amendment to our
Constitution: an unwritten rule of construction that prohibits judges
from questioning economic regulation, especially those types of
regulations that emerged from the New Deal.199 Or perhaps it is a
deeper skepticism of Marbury v. Madison200 that sees judicial review
as inherently problematic.201
In any event, the guiding star of our modern constitutional
consensus is the New Deal and the jurisprudence of judicial restraint
195. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 82 (1996) (“The stench of those cases [Lochner v. New York and Bowers v.
Hardwick] does not lie in any jurisdictional vice or judicial overreaching. After a near century of
treating Lochner as a whipping boy, no one has produced a sound mechanical test that it fails.
The vice of bad decisions is bad argument and bad conviction . . .”); see also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[W]hile the cases in the Lochner
line routinely invoked a correct standard of constitutional arbitrariness review, they harbored the
spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation of the standard they espoused.”).
196. See supra note 80.
197. See supra note 88.
198. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(comparing the common law liberty of contract to Herbert Spencer’s Social Darwinism);
Obergefell v. Hodges,135 S. Ct. 2584, 2617 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (touting Justice
Holmes’ famous “Social Statics” barb from Lochner while equating Lochner with Dred Scott).
199. See 2 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 26 (1998) (“These
New Deal cases not only rejected leading decisions of the old regime, like Lochner v. New
York . . . They transformed Lochner into a symbol of an entire constitutional order that had been
thoroughly repudiated by the American people. These New Deal opinions have operated as the
functional equivalent of formal constitutional amendments . . .”).
200. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
201. Some scholars have argued, for example, that privileging free speech of any kind
“replicates an error of Lochner” by “excessively privileg[ing] one type of right . . . .” Wendy E.
Parmet & Jason A. Smith, Free Speech and Public Health: A Population-Based Approach to the
First Amendment, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 363, 443 (2006). This is a damned-if-you-do, damned-ifyou-don’t argument—if the Court enforces unenumerated rights, it is Lochnerizing; if it enforces
enumerated rights only, it is Lochnerizing. Hostility toward Lochner translates here into hostility
toward judicial review generally.
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that emerged to rubber-stamp it.202 To understand why the judiciary
has not yet recognized a First Amendment liberty of contract
formation, perhaps we need only look to the Court’s unreasoned
opinion in Valentine. There the triumph of New Deal judicial
restraint toward economic regulation was so obvious to the Court
that legal reasoning and citation to precedent was no longer
necessary.203 This is our strange world of modern constitutional
theory.204
The legal profession would do well to contemplate an axiomatic
proposition: The Constitution is not an a-philosophical document. It
protects certain rights, and not others. It instantiates specific roles for
government, and not others. Insofar as it protects a right of contract
formation, it does—to some extent—embrace a philosophy of
economic freedom. Invoking scare words (“laissez-faire”) and
hurling epithets (“Social Darwinism”) cannot change this fact.
Judges must therefore interpret and enforce the Constitution,
regardless of whether they, or certain members of the public at large,
personally agree with its economic philosophy. The Justices of the
Court took an oath;205 they made a promise to the people, a contract
with the nation, to faithfully interpret the First Amendment. Their
word is their bond. We are entitled to the principal.

202. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). But see
generally Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism: Defending Carolene Products (Vand. U. L.
Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 16–9, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2741287
(arguing that there is a “powerful case in favor of a selective judicial activism that privileges
personal rights over economic rights” consistent with Carolene Products).
203. See supra Part I.B.1.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 7–13.
205. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.

